agent-browser
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Feb 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- Indirect Prompt Injection (HIGH): The skill is designed to navigate to and process untrusted external content, creating a major vulnerability surface.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through
agent-browser open <url>andagent-browser snapshot, which retrieves DOM and accessibility tree information (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The documentation does not specify any delimiters or instructions for the agent to ignore content found within the browser context.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant 'write' and 'execute' capabilities including
fill,click,press, andselect, allowing it to perform state-changing actions on websites on behalf of the user. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing retrieved web content or filtering out executable scripts/instructions before they are processed by the agent.
- Data Exposure & Exfiltration (HIGH): The navigation and data extraction commands can be used to target sensitive local or internal data.
- [Category 2] (HIGH): The
agent-browser open <url>command does not restrict protocol schemes. An attacker could potentially usefile://to read local system files (e.g.,~/.ssh/id_rsaor/etc/passwd) orhttp://localhostto probe internal services. - [Category 2] (HIGH): Commands like
agent-browser get text,agent-browser get value, andagent-browser screenshotallow for the extraction of sensitive information from pages, which the agent can then be manipulated into exfiltrating.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata