ssh
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 20, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill documentation encourages and facilitates the storage of sensitive authentication credentials in a predictable local file.
- It references a configuration file at
~/.claude/ssh-targets.jsonthat stores hostnames, usernames, and plaintext passwords. - It explicitly points to sensitive file paths for authentication, such as
~/.ssh/id_rsa. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The primary purpose of the skill is to execute arbitrary shell commands on remote hosts.
- It provides examples using
sudofor administrative actions. - It includes specific instructions for establishing persistence on remote systems using
systemd-runandnohupto keep processes running after the SSH session closes. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains instructions that attempt to control the agent's operational logic and creates a surface for indirect attacks.
- Workflow Override: It mandates a specific execution chain (
planning → gm-execute → gm-emit → gm-complete → update-docs) and the use of subagents, overriding the agent's default task handling. - Indirect Injection Surface:
- Ingestion points: The
exec:sshtool accepts arbitrary shell commands as input from the agent's context (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within processed data.
- Capability inventory: Remote shell execution, privilege escalation (
sudo), and process persistence mechanisms. - Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not describe any validation or escaping of the command string before execution.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the
ssh2npm package to be installed manually by the user usingnpm install.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata