code-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 31, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically locates and executes a JavaScript file (
codex-companion.mjs) from a computed local path (~/.claude/plugins/cache/openai-codex) usingnode. While this is intended for integration with the OpenAI Codex plugin, executing code from a dynamic filesystem path is a risk factor as it relies on the integrity of the plugin cache directory. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data that is then processed by other AI agents.
- Ingestion points: PR descriptions, code diffs, and git history are read using
gh pr view,gh pr diff, andgit loginSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety warnings to distinguish untrusted data from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
Bash(git, gh, node),Read, andAgenttools, which could be abused if the agent obeys instructions embedded in the code being reviewed. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the external content is mentioned before it is passed to the domain agents (Security, Architecture, etc.).
Audit Metadata