pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs shell commands using variables derived from the git environment and user input without explicit sanitization.
- Evidence: In
SKILL.md, variables such as{base-branch},{type_label}, and the PR title are interpolated directly intogh pr createandgh label createcommand strings. - Risk: If a branch name or PR title contains shell metacharacters (e.g.,
;,&&), it could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host system. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and processing untrusted data from the local repository and GitHub environment.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads branch names, commit messages via
git log, and existing PR metadata viagh pr listto populate PR templates. - Boundary markers: The skill uses a quoted heredoc (
cat <<'EOF') when creating the PR body, which is a positive security measure to prevent shell expansion of the body content. - Capability inventory: The skill is authorized to use the
Bashtool forgit,gh, andGrepoperations, and has file-reading capabilities. - Sanitization: No explicit validation or escaping is applied to variables used as CLI flag arguments before they are passed to the shell.
Audit Metadata