skills/chanmuzi/git-conventions/pr/Gen Agent Trust Hub

pr

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 31, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill constructs shell commands using variables derived from the git environment and user input without explicit sanitization.
  • Evidence: In SKILL.md, variables such as {base-branch}, {type_label}, and the PR title are interpolated directly into gh pr create and gh label create command strings.
  • Risk: If a branch name or PR title contains shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &&), it could lead to arbitrary command execution on the host system.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and processing untrusted data from the local repository and GitHub environment.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads branch names, commit messages via git log, and existing PR metadata via gh pr list to populate PR templates.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses a quoted heredoc (cat <<'EOF') when creating the PR body, which is a positive security measure to prevent shell expansion of the body content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill is authorized to use the Bash tool for git, gh, and Grep operations, and has file-reading capabilities.
  • Sanitization: No explicit validation or escaping is applied to variables used as CLI flag arguments before they are passed to the shell.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 31, 2026, 12:19 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — pr