pre-publish-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from the local environment and interpolates it into prompts for multiple AI agents (Ultrabrain and Oracle).
- Ingestion points: The skill reads output from
git log(commit messages),git diff(code changes), and the full text of modified files (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: While the prompts use XML-style tags like
<diff>and<file_contents>, they lack explicit instructions to the agents to disregard or ignore any natural language instructions found within that data. - Capability inventory: The skill itself performs context gathering and logic orchestration. While it does not have direct file-write capabilities, it acts as a gatekeeper for the 'publish' verdict, which could be manipulated by an attacker who controls commit messages or source code.
- Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or instruction-filtering is performed on the git data or file contents before being sent to the LLM agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes several local shell commands to gather context for the review process.
- Evidence: Commands include
npm viewto fetch version info,node -pto parse the local package.json, andgit log/git diffto extract change history. - Context: These are standard development tools used for their intended purpose of project introspection, but they represent a surface for command execution within the skill's workflow.
Audit Metadata