Migrate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 2, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the bun runtime to execute local TypeScript tools (MigrateScan.ts and MigrateApprove.ts) located at ~/.claude/PAI/TOOLS/. These scripts are used for content classification and data commitment.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: A curl command is used to send a POST request to localhost:31337. This network operation is restricted to the local loopback interface and is intended for user notifications.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external files and standard input.
  • Ingestion points: External .md, .txt, and .cursorrules files, as well as piped standard input (Phase 1, SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: Explicit markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are absent in the skill instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can write to the local file system (TELOS/MEMORY directories) and execute local scripts via bun (Phase 4, SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of external content is described.
  • Mitigation: The risk is significantly mitigated by a mandatory human-in-the-loop approval process (Phase 4), which requires users to review and approve classifications before any data is committed to the system.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 2, 2026, 01:03 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — Migrate