setup
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local shell script at
.scripts/meeting-intel/install-automation.shto configure background tasks. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill triggers
npm install, which downloads and installs external packages from the npm registry without specifying a version-locked manifest in the provided instructions. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The setup process establishes a persistent background synchronization mechanism that runs every 30 minutes, creating a long-term execution presence on the host system.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill prompts the user to paste sensitive API keys (Gemini, Anthropic, or OpenAI) directly into the conversation context. While it subsequently moves them to a
.envfile, the initial exposure in the chat history is a security risk. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill targets and reads local application data from the Granola meeting transcription cache located at
~/Library/Application Support/Granola/cache-v*.json. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) as it ingests untrusted data from public profile research and meeting transcripts.
- Ingestion points: Reads external search results during 'Profile Research' and processes local Granola meeting cache files.
- Boundary markers: None observed in the instructions to separate processed data from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: Performs file system writes (
.env,System/user-profile.yaml), directory creation, and shell command execution (npm install,install-automation.sh). - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of the ingested external content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata