skills/davekilleen/dex/setup/Gen Agent Trust Hub

setup

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 20, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFE
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local shell script at .scripts/meeting-intel/install-automation.sh to configure background tasks.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill triggers npm install, which downloads and installs external packages from the npm registry without specifying a version-locked manifest in the provided instructions.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The setup process establishes a persistent background synchronization mechanism that runs every 30 minutes, creating a long-term execution presence on the host system.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill prompts the user to paste sensitive API keys (Gemini, Anthropic, or OpenAI) directly into the conversation context. While it subsequently moves them to a .env file, the initial exposure in the chat history is a security risk.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill targets and reads local application data from the Granola meeting transcription cache located at ~/Library/Application Support/Granola/cache-v*.json.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) as it ingests untrusted data from public profile research and meeting transcripts.
  • Ingestion points: Reads external search results during 'Profile Research' and processes local Granola meeting cache files.
  • Boundary markers: None observed in the instructions to separate processed data from agent instructions.
  • Capability inventory: Performs file system writes (.env, System/user-profile.yaml), directory creation, and shell command execution (npm install, install-automation.sh).
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or validation of the ingested external content before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 20, 2026, 12:41 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — setup