beads
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data in the form of issue descriptions, notes, and comments which could potentially contain prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Commands such as
bd show,bd list,bd ready, andbd searchingest text from the Beads database. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from following directions embedded within issue content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to the
Bashtool (scoped tobd:*) and file system read access. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of issue data is described in the skill files.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation provides instructions to download and execute an installation script from the vendor's official GitHub repository.
- Evidence:
TROUBLESHOOTING.mdcontains the commandcurl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/gastownhall/beads/main/scripts/install.sh | bash. - Context: The resource originates from the author's verified repository (
github.com/gastownhall/beads). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes functionality to synchronize project data, including audit logs of agent interactions, to remote Dolt servers.
- Evidence: The
bd syncandbd dolt pushcommands are used to transmit the local database state to a configured remote. - Context: This is a core feature intended for multi-session and multi-machine collaboration.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the
Bashtool to interact with thebdCLI. - Constraint: The
allowed-toolsfield inSKILL.mdrestricts command execution to thebdbinary using thebd:*pattern.
Audit Metadata