ads
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Persistence mechanism via SessionStart hook.
- File:
references/change-tracking.mdcontains instructions for the agent to modify~/.claude/settings.jsonto include aSessionStartcommand:/home/user/toprank/bin/toprank-change-watch. - This ensures that an external, unverified binary is executed every time the agent session is initialized.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Use of hardcoded local script paths for critical functionality.
- File:
references/change-tracking.mdinstructs the agent to execute/home/user/toprank/bin/toprank-change-watch ics ... > ~/review.icsto generate calendar files. - The skill assumes the existence of and executes code from a non-standard local path outside the skill's own directory or standard tool environment.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Surface for Indirect Prompt Injection via Google Ads data.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads
search_termsandkeywordstext from the Google Ads API (File:SKILL.md,references/search-term-analysis-guide.md). - Boundary markers: None. There are no instructions to the model to ignore or delimit instructions that might be embedded within search queries or keyword metadata.
- Capability inventory: The skill has extensive write capabilities (
pauseKeyword,updateBid,createCampaign) and shell execution capabilities. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the text content returned from the API is performed before processing.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Access to sensitive local configuration and credential files.
- The skill documentation (
SKILL.mdandevals/evals.json) describes a process for reading~/.claude/settings.json,.adsagent.json, and~/.adsagent/config.jsonto resolve API keys and account IDs. - While intended for configuration, accessing internal platform settings and home-directory config files constitutes sensitive data exposure.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata