skill-builder

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 22, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The update command defined in SKILL.md fetches a shell script from a remote repository via https://raw.githubusercontent.com/odysseyalive/claude-enforcer/main/install using curl.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill performs remote code execution in the update command by piping the content fetched from the remote URL directly into a shell interpreter using bash -c "$(curl -fsSL ...)".
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates and executes shell scripts used as 'enforcement hooks' (detailed in references/procedures/hooks.md). These scripts are stored within the skill's local directory and are configured to execute during specific tool invocations via the agent's Bash tool.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the TaskCreate, TaskUpdate, and TaskGet tools to orchestrate complex operations, including the spawning of specialized subagents for validation and research.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) as it ingests and processes untrusted data from other skill files and CLAUDE.md (documented in references/procedures/audit.md).
  • Ingestion points: Reads content from .claude/skills/*/SKILL.md and project root CLAUDE.md.
  • Boundary markers: The skill does not implement explicit delimiters to separate untrusted skill content from its own instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files (Write, Edit), execute shell commands (Bash), and create sub-tasks (TaskCreate).
  • Sanitization: The procedures focus on verbatim preservation of directives, which may allow malicious instructions in processed files to influence the agent's behavior during audits or optimizations.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 22, 2026, 01:52 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — skill-builder