run-agent

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill demonstrates the execution of agents directly from remote Git repositories using the -r flag (e.g., gitagent run -r https://github.com/user/agent). This allows the agent to download and run logic from arbitrary third-party sources, which may contain malicious code or unintended instructions.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a CLI tool (gitagent) to perform system-level operations, including cloning remote repositories to a local cache at ~/.gitagent/cache/ and launching processes for various agent adapters.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill promotes downloading content from external Git repositories. While the examples use placeholders, the functionality encourages the retrieval of unverified data from the internet.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it processes untrusted data from remote repositories and local framework files. Ingestion points: Remote repository contents, .cursorrules, crew.yaml, and .gitagent_adapter files. Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from obeying embedded instructions in these files. Capability inventory: The tool can clone repositories, write to a local cache, and execute agent logic. Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or safety checks performed on the downloaded repository data before it influences the agent's behavior.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Mar 18, 2026, 09:52 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — run-agent