custom-sub-agents
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The file
references/01-agent-folder-structure.mdcontains a Python example (DataProcessorAgent) that utilizespandas.eval()to dynamically add columns to a DataFrame based on expressions provided in an options object. This pattern is highly susceptible to arbitrary code execution if the transformation expressions are sourced from untrusted or user-supplied data. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Both
references/07-project-organization.mdandreferences/08-integration-deployment.mdprovide implementation patterns for dynamic module loading using therequire()function with computed file paths (e.g.,require(path.resolve(file))). Loading modules from paths that can be influenced by external input is a dangerous practice that can lead to the execution of arbitrary local files. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: An example in
references/01-agent-folder-structure.mddemonstrates fetching data from arbitrary URL endpoints using therequestslibrary. If an agent implemented using this template allows users to specify the endpoint URL, it could be exploited for Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) or unauthorized data exfiltration. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
references/04-testing-tools.mdfile provides a reporting utility example that launches a Puppeteer browser instance with the--no-sandboxand--disable-setuid-sandboxflags. Disabling the browser's isolation sandbox is a major security risk that could allow a compromised web page or malicious HTML content to escape the browser and execute code on the host system.
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