launch
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill accesses sensitive authentication and configuration files at
~/.vibes/auth.jsonand~/.vibes/.envto manage deployment tokens and API keys. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The
OPENROUTER_API_KEYis passed as a command-line argument (--ai-key) to thedeploy-cloudflare.jsscript, which can expose the secret to other users or processes on the system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes dynamic JavaScript code blocks using
bun -eand runs various local scripts for server hosting, code assembly, and deployment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Potential command injection vulnerability exists where the skill instructs the agent to interpolate user-provided prompts directly into shell commands (e.g.,
bun ... --prompt "USER_PROMPT_HERE") without sanitization. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Indirect prompt injection surface identified:
- Ingestion points: User input
appPromptis collected viaAskUserQuestioninSKILL.mdand passed to a sub-agent. - Boundary markers: Absent; the user input is directly interpolated into the
prompts/builder.mdtemplate. - Capability inventory: The builder sub-agent is granted broad tool access including
Read,Write,Edit, andBashto perform its generation tasks. - Sanitization: No validation or escaping is performed on the
appPromptbefore it is processed by the sub-agent.
Audit Metadata