codex-code-review
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 20, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes commands derived from the project being reviewed, specifically
{LINT_FIX_COMMAND}and{BUILD_COMMAND}found inCLAUDE.mdorpackage.json. This enables arbitrary command execution if the reviewed project contains malicious script definitions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow depends on the execution of several local shell scripts (
scripts/emit-review-gate.sh,scripts/resolve-feature.sh). These scripts must be present and secure within the project environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from the repository and interpolating it into prompts for the Codex MCP tool.
- Ingestion points: Feature request documentation (
.mdfiles) and historical nit logs (.claude_nit_history.json) are read and processed inSKILL.md(Steps 1.5 and 1.6). - Boundary markers: While some XML tagging is used for deferred context, the implementation lacks robust delimiters for acceptance criteria injected into the
SPEC_CHECKLISTvariable. - Capability inventory: The agent has broad shell access via
Bash(bash:*)and the ability to invoke external MCP tools and sub-tasks. - Sanitization: Step 1.6 specifies basic sanitization (truncation, character stripping), but Step 1.5 (specification-driven review) does not explicitly sanitize the criteria extracted from potentially attacker-controlled markdown files.
Audit Metadata