runbook
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a local script
node scripts/resolve-feature-cli.jsusing theBash(node:*)tool. User input from$ARGUMENTSis passed to this script via the--featureparameter. While the skill instructs the agent to handle these as separate tokens, there is a inherent risk of argument injection if the underlying tool invocation or the script itself does not properly sanitize these inputs. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill performs 'Repo-wide grep' and reads configurations, workflows, and logs to populate the runbook. While
references/discovery-heuristics.mddefines specific redaction rules for API keys, tokens, and credentials (replacing them with placeholders like${ENV_VAR_NAME}), the broad read access required for monitoring signals and SRE references could lead to the exposure of internal metadata if redaction patterns are not exhaustive. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it ingests and processes untrusted data from the repository (tech-specs, architecture docs, and source code) to generate its output.
- Ingestion points: Reads technical specifications, architecture diagrams, and arbitrary repository files via
Read,Grep, andGlobtools. - Boundary markers: The skill uses a structured markdown template and provenance manifest but lacks explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed documentation.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to
WriteandEditfiles, and executeBashcommands for git operations and node scripts. - Sanitization: While the skill implements secret redaction, it does not explicitly sanitize the extracted text to prevent instructions embedded in documentation from influencing the agent's behavior during the generation process.
Audit Metadata