skills-cli
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 23, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates downloading content from external sources such as npm and GitHub.
- Evidence: The use of
bunx skillsdownloads and executes a package from npm. Commands likebunx skills add <package-or-url>fetch content from remote URLs such ashttps://github.com/sjunepark/custom-skillsandvercel-labs/skills. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell command execution to perform its primary tasks.
- Evidence: Frequent use of the
bunxutility to run commands likelist,check,update, andremovefor managing the skill ecosystem. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill is designed to install and manage "skills," which are explicitly defined in the documentation as executable instructions.
- Evidence: Automated installation from remote URLs (
bunx skills add <url>) can lead to the deployment and subsequent execution of untrusted logic or instructions within the agent's context. The skill explicitly warns users to "Treat installed skills as executable instructions; avoid untrusted sources." - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: This skill provides a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection by design.
- Ingestion points: External GitHub repositories and local paths specified via the
addcommand. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings described to isolate the agent from the instructions being downloaded.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands, perform network operations, and modify files in sensitive user directories like
~/.claude/skillsand~/.pi/agent/skills. - Sanitization: No evidence of validation, sanitization, or content filtering for the downloaded instructions is provided before they are installed and active.
Audit Metadata