skills/tw93/claude-health/read/Gen Agent Trust Hub

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 15, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script scripts/fetch.sh uses npx --yes agent-fetch to dynamically download and execute code from the npm registry. This pattern executes unpinned remote code without a confirmation prompt.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill sends user-requested URLs to external services defuddle.md and r.jina.ai for content extraction. It also uses curl to fetch arbitrary data from the web, including images and PDF files.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on various system tools and CLI utilities, including pdftotext, marker_single, gh, and playwright. It also executes shell commands for parallel data processing such as image downloading with curl.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Documentation in references/read-methods.md instructs users to install multiple third-party dependencies and binaries, such as playwright, marker-pdf, and poppler.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted web content which presents a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: External URLs and PDFs fetched in scripts/fetch.sh, scripts/fetch_feishu.py, and scripts/fetch_weixin.py.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; fetched content is displayed without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: Includes file writing to ~/Downloads/, network operations via curl, and execution of various local tools.
  • Sanitization: None; external content is converted to Markdown and provided directly to the agent without escaping or validation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 15, 2026, 08:52 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — read