code-reviewer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/prepare_review_bundle.pyuses thesubprocessmodule to executegitcommands (rev-parse,diff,status). It dynamically incorporates inputs from command-line arguments (such as--base,--head, and--repo) into the command list. While using a list-based API prevents shell injection, the absence of input validation allows for potential argument injection if the script is invoked with malicious parameters. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because the reviewer agent is instructed to process data originating from potentially untrusted sources, such as repository diffs or user-provided summaries.
- Ingestion points: The reviewer agent ingests content from files created in the
.agent/code-reviews/directory, includingrequest.md,writer-summary.md,diff.patch, andtest-output.md. - Boundary markers: The prompt templates provided in
reviewer-prompt.mdandreferences/isolation-protocol.mddo not utilize distinct boundary markers or specific instructions to ignore embedded commands within the analyzed data. - Capability inventory: The reviewer agent has access to a broad set of tools, including
Read,Write,Edit,Bash, andGlob, which could be exploited if the agent follows instructions hidden in the code artifacts. - Sanitization: The skill does not perform any sanitization or filtering of the content captured in the git diff or the summaries before they are presented to the reviewer agent.
Audit Metadata