run-status-monitor
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/run_status_probe.pyexecutes shell commands usingsubprocess.run(shell=True). The commands are sourced directly from a configuration file (runs.yaml), specifically via thestatus_commandandlogs_commandfields in thecommandbackend. If this configuration file is modified by an attacker (e.g., via a Pull Request in a repository the agent is working on), it allows for arbitrary shell command execution within the agent's environment. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script supports remote execution via SSH in its
slurmandrunaibackends. While it employsshlex.quotefor argument sanitization, the ability to trigger remote commands based on workspace configuration is a high-privilege capability that requires careful oversight when dealing with untrusted codebases. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an indirect prompt injection surface by reading raw log files and external command outputs to generate a 'status artifact' for the main agent. Evidence:
scripts/run_status_probe.pyreads untrusted data (logs/command output), lacks boundary markers to delimit this data, and utilizes capabilities like shell execution and file writing. There is no sanitization to prevent instructions embedded in logs from being treated as authoritative by the agent when it reads the generated artifact.
Audit Metadata