domain-hunter

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 10, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The file references/spaceship-api.md contains instructions for the agent to extract SPACESHIP_API_KEY and SPACESHIP_API_SECRET from the user's ~/.zshrc file using shell commands (grep and cut).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions and documentation include the execution of various shell commands:
  • whois queries to check domain availability in SKILL.md and the example usage.
  • python scripts/domain_checker.py to perform bulk availability checks.
  • curl operations in references/spaceship-api.md to interact with the Spaceship API for registration, DNS management, and account operations.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is configured to read local credentials from shell configuration files and transmit them to an external endpoint (https://spaceship.dev/api). While this is functional for the intended use-case (API interaction), it follows a pattern of local secret harvesting and remote transmission.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to Indirect Prompt Injection through Step 3 (Find Promo Codes) in SKILL.md.
  • Ingestion points: The skill uses WebSearch to fetch content from x.com and reddit.com (e.g., searching for promo codes and coupons).
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the search results.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands (whois), perform network operations (curl), and open URLs (open).
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization for the search result content before it is processed by the agent.
  • Risk: An attacker could post a malicious "promo code" on social media that contains instructions to exfiltrate data or execute dangerous commands if interpreted by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 10, 2026, 03:14 AM