deeplake-managed
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 26, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Documentation in
SKILL.mdadvises usingsudo apt-get install ffmpegto satisfy prerequisites for video ingestion. If an agent attempts to execute this command autonomously, it would involve a privilege escalation attempt. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires installing multiple third-party packages from PyPI and NPM (e.g.,
deeplake,pymupdf,sharp). It also facilitates downloading data from HuggingFace via the_huggingfaceparameter in the ingestion method. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted external data, including local files (PDF, Video, Text) and HuggingFace datasets, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions embedded in the data could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Ingestion of local file system paths and HuggingFace datasets through the
client.ingestmethod as documented inSKILL.mdandexamples.md. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or boundary markers are described to isolate data from potential instructions during ingestion.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to read/write files and execute shell commands via the
BashandReadtools specified in the frontmatter. - Sanitization: No evidence of content-level sanitization or validation is present in the provided documentation or format classes.
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