frame-tv
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 5, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic context injection (
!command) inSKILL.mdto execute shell commands when the skill is loaded. These commands are used for 'Setup Status' to verify if theuvtool is installed and if theGEMINI_API_KEYis configured in the environment or specific hidden configuration files. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted user data that is then used to construct requests for an AI image generation model.
- Ingestion points: The
--promptand--input-imagearguments inscripts/frame_tv_art.pyallow users to provide text and images. - Boundary markers: Absent. User prompts are directly concatenated with hardcoded strings (e.g., '. High resolution, museum-quality artwork...') without using delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The associated script
scripts/frame_tv_art.pycan read local files, perform network operations (via the Google Gemini API), and write files to the local filesystem. - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the user-provided prompt text before it is interpolated into the final API request.
Audit Metadata