semanticscholar-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to generate and execute a Python script (e.g.,
/tmp/s2_search.py) to interact with the provideds2.pylibrary. This involves dynamic path searching for the library within the user's home directory (e.g.,~/.claude/skills/). This is an intended function for local tool discovery and script-based API interaction. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes untrusted data from the external Semantic Scholar API (paper titles, abstracts, and TLDRs), creating a surface for potential injection.
- Ingestion points: API responses are fetched from
api.semanticscholar.orgvia thes2.pyhelper module, as described in Phase 2 of the search workflow. - Boundary markers: The output formatting functions (
format_results,format_details) do not implement explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded instructions within the academic content. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to perform network requests to academic endpoints and write result files to the local filesystem (e.g.,
/tmp/s2_results.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the API-provided data is performed before the content is presented to the agent's context.
Audit Metadata