semanticscholar-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow requires the agent to generate a Python script (typically saved to
/tmp/s2_search.py) and execute it via the shell. This pattern is used to handle complex API logic, pagination, and rate limiting through the provided helper module. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted metadata (paper titles, abstracts, and TLDRs) from the Semantic Scholar API. • Ingestion points: External data is fetched via the
requestslibrary in thes2.pyhelper module. • Boundary markers: The current implementation lacks explicit delimiters or isolation markers to separate retrieved API data from the agent's instructions. • Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to execute generated scripts and write data to the local filesystem (e.g., viaexport_markdownandexport_json). • Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of external content is performed before the data is formatted and presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata