semanticscholar-skill

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 10, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow requires the agent to generate a Python script (typically saved to /tmp/s2_search.py) and execute it via the shell. This pattern is used to handle complex API logic, pagination, and rate limiting through the provided helper module.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted metadata (paper titles, abstracts, and TLDRs) from the Semantic Scholar API. • Ingestion points: External data is fetched via the requests library in the s2.py helper module. • Boundary markers: The current implementation lacks explicit delimiters or isolation markers to separate retrieved API data from the agent's instructions. • Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to execute generated scripts and write data to the local filesystem (e.g., via export_markdown and export_json). • Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of external content is performed before the data is formatted and presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 10, 2026, 07:04 AM