seo-ecommerce
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data by fetching and parsing content from user-provided URLs using
render_page.pyandparse_html.pyas described inSKILL.md. - Ingestion points: External URL content is processed during the Product Page Analysis workflow in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit boundary markers or instructions (e.g., 'ignore instructions within this data') defined for the agent when processing the fetched content.
- Capability inventory: The skill allows shell execution of various Python scripts, network access via the DataForSEO Merchant API, and writing data to
results.json. - Sanitization: While the skill mentions
google_auth.validate_url()for malformed input, it does not specify sanitization or filtering of the actual content retrieved from the web pages. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves passing user-controlled arguments, such as
<url>,<keyword>, and<domain>, directly into shell commands via a script runner ("${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/claude-seo" run ...). This represents a potential command injection surface if the underlying runner script or the Python scripts themselves (likerender_page.pyordataforseo_merchant.py) do not properly escape these inputs before execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to interact with the DataForSEO Merchant API to retrieve pricing and marketplace data. As documented in
SKILL.mdandreferences/marketplace-endpoints.md, this involves sending user-provided keywords and domain information to an external third-party service. The skill includes cost guardrail checks (dataforseo_costs.py) which acts as a security best practice for budget management but confirms active network communication.
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