seo-flow
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The orchestration logic for the
/seo flow synccommand executes a local Python script atscripts/sync_flow.py. Because the contents of this script are missing from the provided files, its security properties and actual behavior cannot be verified. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill's synchronization feature pulls data from an external GitHub repository (
github.com/AgriciDaniel/flow). While this is a vendor-owned resource, the execution of downloaded content at runtime creates a potential supply chain risk. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Documentation in
SKILL.mdreferences the use of the GitHub CLI tool (gh api rate_limit,gh auth login), indicating that the skill may interact with the user's local environment, shell, and authentication tokens. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data via URL and topic arguments in several commands (find, leverage, optimize, win, local).
- Ingestion points: Arguments
[url|topic]in multiple/seo flowsub-commands. - Boundary markers: Absent. The orchestration logic instructs the agent to apply prompts directly to the URL context.
- Capability inventory: Execution of
scripts/sync_flow.pyvia subprocess, file system reads of reference prompts, and terminal output. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of input validation or escaping for the user-provided URLs.
Audit Metadata