seo-google
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes data from untrusted external sources.
- Ingestion points: The
youtube-videocommand retrieves user-generated YouTube comments, and thenlpcommand extracts entities from arbitrary URLs provided during analysis. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit instructions or delimiters in the markdown templates or the command descriptions to warn the agent about potentially malicious instructions embedded in the retrieved data.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes several local Python scripts via the
${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/claude-seo runwrapper for its core functionality and writes audit reports to local markdown files. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the ingested content before it is presented to the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing local Python scripts to perform its functions.
- Evidence: Multiple commands in
SKILL.mdinvoke${CLAUDE_PLUGIN_ROOT}/scripts/claude-seo runwith scripts such aspagespeed_check.py,gsc_query.py, andga4_report.py. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation references external dependencies and makes requests to remote services.
- Evidence:
references/keyword-planner-api.mdmentionspip install google-ads. The skill also communicates with official Google API endpoints likegoogleapis.com, which are well-known and trusted services for this use case.
Audit Metadata