seo-image-gen

SUSPICIOUS. The skill’s image-generation behavior is broadly aligned with its SEO purpose, but its core function depends on an external banana/nanobanana extension installed via a shell script and an intermediary MCP stack that is not verifiable from the provided content. That creates moderate supply-chain and credential-forwarding risk, though there is no clear evidence of malicious intent or disproportionate access.

This fragment is not malicious code itself; it is preset configuration/documentation. The main security concern is that presets include ImageMagick `post_processing` strings (including shell-like chaining with `&&`). If the consuming application executes these `post_processing` strings via a shell or without strict allowlisting/sanitization—especially when loading user-created presets from `~/.banana/presets/`—it can become a command-execution / command-injection vector. Review the downstream preset loader/executor to confirm it does not interpret `post_processing` as a shell command string and that it validates/allowlists operations and paths.