book-writing-workspace
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workspace provides several Python scripts, such as
setup_workspace.pyandbuild_review_pdf.py, that execute shell commands and Docker containers using thesubprocessmodule. These commands are necessary for creating the project structure and running the Re:VIEW build toolchain. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill refers to and utilizes external resources including the
vvakame/reviewDocker image and theunicode-display_widthRuby gem. These are well-known and standard dependencies within the Re:VIEW publishing ecosystem. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill configures AI agents (e.g., @writing-reviewer) to read and process manuscripts in the
02_contents/directory. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection, as malicious instructions within a manuscript could potentially override the agent's review guidelines. - Ingestion points:
02_contents/(Markdown manuscript files) - Boundary markers: None identified; manuscripts are processed directly as raw text.
- Capability inventory: Agent permissions include reading and editing workspace files and running terminal commands for conversion and building.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization of manuscript content before processing is present in the conversion scripts.
Audit Metadata