compose-expert
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface by combining untrusted data ingestion with exploitable shell capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content enters the agent context through GitHub PR diffs and file contents (fetched via
ghCLI) as well as local project files scanned during initialization (referenced inreferences/pr-review.mdandreferences/auto-init.md). - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or specific warnings to ignore instructions that might be hidden within the code or comments of the PR being analyzed.
- Capability inventory: The skill instructs the agent to perform multiple subprocess calls including
gh pr diff,gh api,find, andgrepto analyze codebases and PRs (referenced inreferences/pr-review.mdandreferences/auto-init.md). - Sanitization: Absent. External content from GitHub and local files is processed directly for review without filtering for injection patterns.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell commands (
gh,find,grep,xargs) to automate project detection and code review. These operations are intended for the skill's primary purpose but operate on data derived from external PR URLs and file contents, which presents a surface for potential misuse (referenced inreferences/pr-review.mdandreferences/auto-init.md).
Audit Metadata