frontend-slides
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use platform-specific shell commands (
open,xdg-open,start) to open the generated HTML presentation in a web browser. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: For PowerPoint conversion, the skill attempts to use the
python-pptxlibrary and suggests installing it viapipif it is missing from the environment. This represents a standard dependency installation from a well-known repository. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and runs Python code to extract data from
.pptand.pptxfiles during the conversion process, which is a common pattern for file processing skills. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from external sources to generate executable HTML/JS code.
- Ingestion points: User-provided notes, topics, and external PowerPoint (
.ppt/.pptx) files processed in the conversion workflow. - Boundary markers: None identified in the instructions to delimit untrusted data from agent instructions during the content discovery or conversion phases.
- Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands for file opening, run Python scripts for data extraction, and potentially use browser automation tools for layout validation.
- Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, escaping, or validation steps are defined for the content extracted from external files or user notes before it is interpolated into the generated presentation code.
Audit Metadata