frontend-slides

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to use platform-specific shell commands (open, xdg-open, start) to open the generated HTML presentation in a web browser.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: For PowerPoint conversion, the skill attempts to use the python-pptx library and suggests installing it via pip if it is missing from the environment. This represents a standard dependency installation from a well-known repository.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and runs Python code to extract data from .ppt and .pptx files during the conversion process, which is a common pattern for file processing skills.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from external sources to generate executable HTML/JS code.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided notes, topics, and external PowerPoint (.ppt/.pptx) files processed in the conversion workflow.
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the instructions to delimit untrusted data from agent instructions during the content discovery or conversion phases.
  • Capability inventory: The agent can execute shell commands for file opening, run Python scripts for data extraction, and potentially use browser automation tools for layout validation.
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, escaping, or validation steps are defined for the content extracted from external files or user notes before it is interpolated into the generated presentation code.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 27, 2026, 04:55 PM