riper5-protocol
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill defines workflows that execute shell commands to manage development environments.
- Evidence: Commands such as
git checkout -b,mkdir -p .tasks,touch,git add --all, andgit commitare integrated into the mode-based execution logic inSKILL.md. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions use strong imperative language to override standard agent behavior and enforce a strict internal protocol.
- Evidence: Directives like "Failure to declare your mode is a serious violation" and "Meta-instruction: Mode Declaration Requirement" are used to mandate behavioral compliance.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface due to its capability to process untrusted data with high-privilege tool access.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads external files in
RESEARCHmode and processes a[用户的完整任务描述](User Task Description) field in the task file template. - Boundary markers: Present in the form of a "WARNING" section in the task file template, but these instruct the agent to protect the protocol rather than sanitizing input data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the authority to create files, modify codebases, and execute Git commands across the project.
- Sanitization: No explicit logic is provided to sanitize, escape, or validate content ingested from local files or task descriptions before it influences the planning and execution phases.
- Risk Factor: The
YOLO_MODE: Onconfiguration allows the agent to execute all planned steps autonomously, significantly increasing the risk that an indirect injection could lead to unauthorized system changes without user oversight.
Audit Metadata