workspace
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes external research data and metadata, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection if source documents are maliciously crafted.
- Ingestion points: The
evidence.ymlstore, synchronized content from Overleaf, and local Quarto (.qmd) and LaTeX (.tex) files. - Boundary markers: The
what-changed.pyutility includes a built-in allowlist-based HTML sanitizer to prevent script execution when viewing diffs. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including shell access via
Bash(SKILL.md), and file modification viaWriteandEdittools. - Sanitization:
what-changed.pyuses thesanitize_fragmentfunction to filter out<script>,<style>, and other potentially dangerous tags and attributes from embedded page content. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Managed assets and themes are downloaded from the author's trusted organization on GitHub.
- Evidence:
assets/Makefileandassets/workspace.mkcontain logic to download tarballs fromgithub.com/allenai/asta-pluginsusingcurl. - Context: The downloads target a recognized, trusted organization and are necessary for the skill's infrastructure.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill automates project tasks by executing shell and CLI commands.
- Evidence: Python scripts (
paper-discovery.py,paper-viewer.py,what-changed.py) and shell scripts (wait-for-preview.sh) invokegit,gh, andquartovia subprocesses. - Context: Command execution is scoped to managing the research project's lifecycle, such as tracking changes, rendering documents, and interacting with GitHub APIs.
Audit Metadata