skills
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Accesses the
~/.claude/settings.jsonconfiguration file and the~/.claude/skills/directory. The settings file is a primary target as it frequently contains MCP server definitions, which often include sensitive information such as environment variables, authentication tokens, or internal system paths. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8) by processing content from all locally installed skill files.
- Ingestion points: Metadata fields (
name,description,argument-hint) from allSKILL.mdfiles located in~/.claude/skills/. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions do not provide delimiters or warnings to the agent to disregard instructions that may be embedded within the description or other fields of the files being read.
- Capability inventory: Filesystem access tools (
GlobandRead) are used to traverse and inspect user directories. - Sanitization: Absent. Extracted text from skill files is processed and output directly, which could allow a malicious skill file to influence the agent's behavior during the extraction or categorization phase.
Audit Metadata