pencil-design
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 1, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to install and run the
@pencil.dev/clipackage from the NPM registry usingnpm installandnpx. This results in the execution of unverified third-party code that is not contained within the skill's distribution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides explicit instructions and
curlcommands to download and replace its ownSKILL.mdfile from remote CDNs such asunpkg.comandjsdelivr.net. This creates a significant vector for remote instruction injection, where an external party could modify the skill's logic to perform malicious actions in future sessions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on shell command execution for checking installations, performing user authentication (
pencil login,pencil signup), and managing design generation operations. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it interpolates user-supplied text directly into the command-line arguments of the Pencil tool.
- Ingestion points: The
--promptargument in thepencilcommand withinSKILL.mdcaptures user input. - Boundary markers: Absent. The instructions explicitly tell the agent to pass the user's request "exactly" as said without adding detail.
- Capability inventory: The
pencilCLI tool has the capability to write files to the local system (--out) and export images (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No escaping, validation, or filtering of the user-provided prompt content is performed before execution.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://unpkg.com/@pencil.dev/cli@latest/SKILL.md - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata