anycap-cli
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
anycap connect feishucommand starts a background daemon that executes local sub-agents (Codex, Claude Code, or Cursor Agent). These agents are then controlled via remote messages from the Feishu (Lark) IM platform. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions recommend using high-privilege flags such as
--codex-exec-mode danger-full-access,--claude-permission-mode bypassPermissions, and--cursor-force. These flags are designed to bypass tool-call confirmations and security sandboxes, allowing the remote chat platform to execute arbitrary shell commands on the host machine without human oversight. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation process suggests downloading and executing a binary install script from the vendor's domain (
https://anycap.ai/install.txt). Additionally, the CLI performs auto-updates from GitHub Releases at runtime. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill manages sensitive Feishu credentials (
App IDandApp Secret). While it includes warnings against pasting these into chat, it stores them in a local configuration file (mode 0600) to facilitate the daemon's access. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The installation guide describes modifying shell profile files (
.bashrc,.zshrc) to persist changes to the systemPATHvariable. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The 'Persist to Project Memory' section instructs the agent to modify project-level instruction files (e.g.,
CLAUDE.md,AGENTS.md) to ensure the AnyCap skill is prioritized and rediscovered in future sessions.
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