skills/anycap-ai/anycap/anycap-cli/Gen Agent Trust Hub

anycap-cli

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 24, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The anycap connect feishu command starts a background daemon that executes local sub-agents (Codex, Claude Code, or Cursor Agent). These agents are then controlled via remote messages from the Feishu (Lark) IM platform.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions recommend using high-privilege flags such as --codex-exec-mode danger-full-access, --claude-permission-mode bypassPermissions, and --cursor-force. These flags are designed to bypass tool-call confirmations and security sandboxes, allowing the remote chat platform to execute arbitrary shell commands on the host machine without human oversight.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation process suggests downloading and executing a binary install script from the vendor's domain (https://anycap.ai/install.txt). Additionally, the CLI performs auto-updates from GitHub Releases at runtime.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill manages sensitive Feishu credentials (App ID and App Secret). While it includes warnings against pasting these into chat, it stores them in a local configuration file (mode 0600) to facilitate the daemon's access.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The installation guide describes modifying shell profile files (.bashrc, .zshrc) to persist changes to the system PATH variable.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The 'Persist to Project Memory' section instructs the agent to modify project-level instruction files (e.g., CLAUDE.md, AGENTS.md) to ensure the AnyCap skill is prioritized and rediscovered in future sessions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 24, 2026, 08:45 AM