anysearch
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The CLI tools provided (
anysearch_cli.py,anysearch_cli.js,anysearch_cli.ps1,anysearch_cli.sh) include a feature in thebatch_searchcommand that reads the content of a local file if the argument starts with the '@' character (e.g.,@queries.json). The content of the file is then transmitted to the vendor's API endpoint (https://api.anysearch.com/mcp). While intended for processing query lists, this capability could be abused to exfiltrate sensitive local data if an attacker tricks the agent into passing a sensitive file path to the command. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The
README.mdprovides installation instructions that involve downloading the skill's source code as a ZIP archive from the vendor's official GitHub repository athttps://github.com/anysearch-ai/anysearch-skill/archive/refs/tags/v2.0.0.zip. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) because it retrieves and processes untrusted data from external websites.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through search result snippets from the
searchcommand and full-page Markdown content from theextractcommand in all CLI implementations. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not implement or recommend the use of delimiters or specific framing instructions to help the agent distinguish search results from its core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment permits network communication to the vendor's API and local file system access (reading/writing
.envandruntime.conf) across all scripts. - Sanitization: Absent. Content fetched from the web is passed directly to the agent without filtering or sanitization.
Audit Metadata