claude-history-ingest

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local application data and configuration files, including ~/.claude/settings.json, ~/.claude/history.jsonl, and the Claude Desktop application support directory (~/Library/Application Support/Claude/local-agent-mode-sessions/). It also reads .env files during configuration resolution. These locations contain high-value data such as full conversation histories, tool call records, and environment-specific variables.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external Python scripts (manifest.py, extract-jsonl.py) from a directory path defined by the $OBSIDIAN_WIKI_REPO environment variable. It also invokes several local command-line utilities, including qmd and obsidian-wiki, to update search indexes and sync memory.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from Claude conversation histories and audit logs, which could contain malicious instructions from past sessions.
  • Ingestion points: Conversation logs (.jsonl), memory files (.md), and audit logs (audit.jsonl).
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiter-based prompt boundaries are defined for the ingested text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands (python3, qmd, obsidian-wiki), write files to an Obsidian vault, and read diverse local system paths.
  • Sanitization: The instructions recommend manually skipping secrets and personal content, but there is no mention of programmatic sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the ingested content.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 13, 2026, 07:48 AM