claude-history-ingest
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local application data and configuration files, including
~/.claude/settings.json,~/.claude/history.jsonl, and the Claude Desktop application support directory (~/Library/Application Support/Claude/local-agent-mode-sessions/). It also reads.envfiles during configuration resolution. These locations contain high-value data such as full conversation histories, tool call records, and environment-specific variables. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external Python scripts (
manifest.py,extract-jsonl.py) from a directory path defined by the$OBSIDIAN_WIKI_REPOenvironment variable. It also invokes several local command-line utilities, includingqmdandobsidian-wiki, to update search indexes and sync memory. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from Claude conversation histories and audit logs, which could contain malicious instructions from past sessions.
- Ingestion points: Conversation logs (
.jsonl), memory files (.md), and audit logs (audit.jsonl). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiter-based prompt boundaries are defined for the ingested text.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute shell commands (
python3,qmd,obsidian-wiki), write files to an Obsidian vault, and read diverse local system paths. - Sanitization: The instructions recommend manually skipping secrets and personal content, but there is no mention of programmatic sanitization, escaping, or filtering of the ingested content.
Audit Metadata