ingest-url
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to run shell commands for project detection (
git remote get-url origin) and content extraction (defuddle <url>). Directly passing a user-provided or externally-sourced URL into a shell command is a known vulnerability pattern for command injection if the agent does not properly escape the input.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions include patterns associated with prompt injection, such as "ignore previous instructions." In this context, these patterns are used defensively within a 'Content Trust Boundary' section. The skill explicitly directs the agent to ignore any instructions embedded in fetched web content and treat it strictly as data to be processed.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The core functionality of the skill involves retrieving content from arbitrary external URLs provided by the user via theWebFetchtool or thedefuddleCLI. This involves processing untrusted data from the public internet.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection (Category 8) due to its processing of untrusted web data.\n - Ingestion points: Web content retrieved via
WebFetchordefuddleoutput (SKILL.md).\n - Boundary markers: Present; the skill defines a 'Content Trust Boundary' to separate instructions from distilled content.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of writing to the local filesystem (Obsidian vault) and executing shell commands (
git,defuddle).\n - Sanitization: Absent; the skill relies on the LLM's adherence to negative constraints rather than automated data sanitization or structural isolation.
Audit Metadata