skills/ar9av/obsidian-wiki/wiki-agent/Gen Agent Trust Hub

wiki-agent

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes shell commands such as rg (ripgrep) and a custom obsidian-wiki CLI to search through and synchronize agent histories. These commands are constructed by interpolating user-provided query strings directly into shell execution strings. This pattern is vulnerable to command injection; a query containing shell metacharacters (e.g., ;, &&, |, or backticks) could allow a malicious user or a malicious process providing the query to execute arbitrary commands on the host system.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to read private conversation history files from various AI agents. These files are located in sensitive local paths including ~/.claude, ~/.codex, ~/.hermes, ~/.openclaw, and ~/.pi. This functionality exposes potentially sensitive personal or professional information to the AI agent's processing context, which constitutes data exposure of private chat logs.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates shell commands at runtime. Specifically, in Step 4 and Step 7, it constructs commands like rg -i "<query terms>" <session.jsonl> and obsidian-wiki memory sync ... query="<query>". Because these commands incorporate untrusted user input into an executable command template without proper escaping or sanitization, they represent a significant dynamic execution risk.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes raw, untrusted data from past AI agent conversations. This creates a vulnerability surface where instructions embedded in the history could influence the agent's current behavior during the distillation or synthesis phase.
  • Ingestion points: The skill reads from various history files including JSONL and Markdown files across multiple agent history roots (e.g., ~/.claude/projects/, ~/.pi/agent/sessions/).
  • Boundary markers: There are no specific instructions or delimiters mentioned that would prevent the agent from accidentally following instructions found within the ingested history blobs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to read local files, write to the Obsidian vault, and execute various CLI tools.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization, filtering, or escaping of the extracted history content is provided before it is used to update wiki pages or generate synthesized answers.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 6, 2026, 01:26 AM