wiki-research
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a 'Research Backends' feature that reads shell command templates from a local file (
references/research-backends.md) and executes them using the system shell. It also executes management commands likeobsidian-wiki memory syncandqmd updatedirectly in the shell. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The backend execution mechanism performs string substitution on the
invoketemplate (e.g.,{url},{query}) and executes the resulting string in a shell. This represents a command injection vector if the substituted values contain shell metacharacters, potentially allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary code. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically constructs and executes executable content at runtime by loading command strings from a data file and populating them with external inputs.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external websites to synthesize research results and create wiki pages, creating a vulnerability to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: External content fetched via
WebSearch,WebFetch, and custom CLI backends. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or warnings for the agent to disregard instructions embedded within the fetched content.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to write multiple files to the local file system (Obsidian vault) and execute shell-based indexing and logging tools (
obsidian-wiki memory sync,qmd). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering applied to external content before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata