claude-code-codex-delegation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill invokes an external CLI tool named
codexusing flags like--full-autoand--sandbox write. This configuration allows the tool to perform file modifications and other repository actions without explicit user approval for each operation, creating a risk of unintended changes if a prompt is misinterpreted. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions direct the agent to suppress stderr output using
2>/dev/null. This suppresses 'thinking tokens' and error messages, effectively concealing the delegated tool's internal reasoning and potential failure states from the user's view. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Standalone installation involves cloning code from
github.com/skills-directory/skill-codex.git. This is an external repository from a source not recognized as a trusted vendor, and the skill lacks integrity verification for the downloaded content. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents a surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and summarizing output from the
codextool—which may process untrusted repository content—without using explicit boundary markers or sanitization logic. - Ingestion points: Resulting output from
codex execcommands (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No markers identified for separating tool output from agent context.
- Capability inventory: File system modification via
codex exec --sandbox writeand code execution via CLI (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of tool output is described.
Audit Metadata