figma-bridge-html-export

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation guide requires cloning a repository from an unverified personal account (kingkongshot) that is not recognized as a trusted organization or vendor.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The setup process involves running npm install and npm run dev, which executes scripts and binary content from the cloned repository on the user's system.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By facilitating the download and execution of code from an external, unverified GitHub repository, the skill creates a path for potential remote code execution.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill converts Figma design nodes into content for LLM processing, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Figma node data (text, layer names, and properties) processed by the bridge-pipeline and plugin code described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Absent in the provided code examples; design data is directly stringified into prompts.
  • Capability inventory: Local file system access for writing generated code to output/ and debug/ directories, and running a local server on port 7788.
  • Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or filtering of Figma text content before it is processed or passed to an LLM.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
May 18, 2026, 07:52 AM