figma-bridge-html-export
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation guide requires cloning a repository from an unverified personal account (
kingkongshot) that is not recognized as a trusted organization or vendor. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The setup process involves running
npm installandnpm run dev, which executes scripts and binary content from the cloned repository on the user's system. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: By facilitating the download and execution of code from an external, unverified GitHub repository, the skill creates a path for potential remote code execution.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill converts Figma design nodes into content for LLM processing, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Figma node data (text, layer names, and properties) processed by the
bridge-pipelineand plugin code described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent in the provided code examples; design data is directly stringified into prompts.
- Capability inventory: Local file system access for writing generated code to
output/anddebug/directories, and running a local server on port 7788. - Sanitization: No evidence of sanitization or filtering of Figma text content before it is processed or passed to an LLM.
Audit Metadata