power-design-slides

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external URLs to extract brand DNA (colors, typography, and voice). This content is interpolated into prompts to generate slide decks, which presents a risk of indirect prompt injection if the source website contains instructions designed to override the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Data extracted via Firecrawl from arbitrary URLs is processed in brand_extractor.py and referenced in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to disregard embedded instructions within the scraped brand data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill creates and writes local HTML files (slides.html) and provides patterns for executing CLI commands.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization logic for the scraped content is present; parameters are passed directly to the generation prompt.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Documentation for the skill includes a Python script (deck_generator.py) that uses subprocess.run to execute the claude CLI tool with variable-based prompts. This pattern is noted as a surface for command injection if implemented in environments with unvalidated user input.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation instructions direct users to clone the skill's source code from an external GitHub repository (ItsssssJack/power-design).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 17, 2026, 02:20 AM