power-design-slides
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 17, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from external URLs to extract brand DNA (colors, typography, and voice). This content is interpolated into prompts to generate slide decks, which presents a risk of indirect prompt injection if the source website contains instructions designed to override the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Data extracted via Firecrawl from arbitrary URLs is processed in
brand_extractor.pyand referenced inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to disregard embedded instructions within the scraped brand data.
- Capability inventory: The skill creates and writes local HTML files (
slides.html) and provides patterns for executing CLI commands. - Sanitization: No sanitization logic for the scraped content is present; parameters are passed directly to the generation prompt.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Documentation for the skill includes a Python script (
deck_generator.py) that usessubprocess.runto execute theclaudeCLI tool with variable-based prompts. This pattern is noted as a surface for command injection if implemented in environments with unvalidated user input. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The installation instructions direct users to clone the skill's source code from an external GitHub repository (
ItsssssJack/power-design).
Audit Metadata