openless-voice-input
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 3, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to clone a repository from an unverified GitHub account (
appergb/openless) and download pre-built binaries from GitHub Releases. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation and build process involves running
npm ciandcargo install, which download and execute numerous third-party dependencies from public registries. It also includes the execution of a local shell script./scripts/build-mac.shfor production builds. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides multiple shell commands for development, building, and troubleshooting, such as
npm run tauri dev,cargo check, andcurltests for the Ark endpoint. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill describes accessing application-specific sensitive data stored in the macOS/Windows Keychain and a fallback file at
~/.openless/credentials.json(mode 0600). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The application creates a surface for indirect prompt injection by processing potentially untrusted voice input through an LLM and inserting the result into system-wide text fields.
- Ingestion points: Mic audio is converted to a transcript and passed to an LLM in
polish.rs. - Boundary markers: The skill uses system prompts to instruct the LLM to only 'reshape' text and explicitly forbids answering questions.
- Capability inventory: The
insertion.rscomponent uses Accessibility and synthetic input APIs to write text into the active cursor of any running application. - Sanitization: The documentation notes the use of LLM-based constraints but does not mention programmatic sanitization or filtering of the transcript before LLM processing.
Audit Metadata