skills/arenahito/piggychick/impl-plan/Gen Agent Trust Hub

impl-plan

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection because it is designed to ingest and process information from external data sources provided by the user.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md Step 1 (Gather Requirements) explicitly instructs the agent to collect information from external URLs (e.g., Notion, Figma, GitHub, Jira, Slack).
  • Boundary markers: The plan template and workflow instructions lack specific guidance on using delimiters or safety warnings when incorporating content from these external sources.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can write files to the project's .tasks/ directory, launch additional agent instances for reviews, and execute system commands for identifier generation.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the external source data is described in the workflow.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves the execution of local system utilities and development tools.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md Step 3 recommends the use of uuidgen for generating unique task identifiers. Additionally, references/plan-json-schema.md provides yq commands as examples for programmatically managing plan metadata.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 29, 2026, 10:54 PM