impl-plan
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection because it is designed to ingest and process information from external data sources provided by the user.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdStep 1 (Gather Requirements) explicitly instructs the agent to collect information from external URLs (e.g., Notion, Figma, GitHub, Jira, Slack). - Boundary markers: The plan template and workflow instructions lack specific guidance on using delimiters or safety warnings when incorporating content from these external sources.
- Capability inventory: The skill can write files to the project's
.tasks/directory, launch additional agent instances for reviews, and execute system commands for identifier generation. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the external source data is described in the workflow.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow involves the execution of local system utilities and development tools.
- Evidence:
SKILL.mdStep 3 recommends the use ofuuidgenfor generating unique task identifiers. Additionally,references/plan-json-schema.mdprovidesyqcommands as examples for programmatically managing plan metadata.
Audit Metadata