skf-brief-skill
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill generates and executes shell commands that include unvalidated user input. In
analyze-target.md, thegit clonecommand interpolates repository owner and name variables derived from user input without explicit sanitization. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple workflow stages (e.g.,
gather-intent.md,write-brief.md,scope-definition.md) use heredocs (such asSKF_TARGET,SKF_JSON, andSKF_SCOPE_PAYLOAD) to pass user-supplied content to scripts. These heredocs can be terminated by a malicious user including the delimiter in their input, leading to arbitrary shell command execution. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
uv runto execute local Python scripts at paths determined dynamically during the workflow, such as{resolvePackageHelper}and{detectLanguageHelper}, which are resolved based on project structure. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function involves analyzing external repository content, manifests, and documentation. This creates a significant surface for indirect prompt injection, where malicious instructions hidden in the analyzed codebase could manipulate the agent's behavior during brief generation.
- [PERSISTENCE]: The
customize.tomlconfiguration allows for anon_completeshell command to be defined. This command is executed automatically every time a skill brief is successfully written, providing a vector for persistent code execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs
git cloneoperations on remote repositories provided by the user to facilitate local code analysis.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata