skf-create-skill
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and processes untrusted data from external GitHub repositories (source code, issues, PRs) and user-provided documentation URLs.
- Ingestion points: Source files from
source_repo, external documentation fromdoc_urls, and temporal context (issues/PRs/releases) fetched via the GitHub API. - Boundary markers: The skill relies on 'zero hallucination' instructions and provenance-tiered citations (e.g.,
[AST:...],[EXT:...]) to distinguish source content. It does not explicitly instruct the agent to ignore embedded instructions within the processed data. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities including shell command execution (
python3,git,gh,ast-grep,qmd), file system writes, and network access. - Sanitization: Implements a sanitization pass to replace angle brackets in skill descriptions and mandates double-quoting for all shell path interpolations.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on various CLI tools (
git,gh,ast-grep,qmd,python3) for core operations such as cloning, data extraction, and artifact generation. It utilizes a local scriptskf-atomic-write.pyfor atomic file operations. The instructions specifically mandate wrapping path interpolations in double quotes to prevent shell injection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs several external network operations, including cloning repositories, querying the GitHub API, and fetching content from remote documentation URLs. It also uses
npxto download and execute theskill-checkandtesslvalidation tools at runtime.
Audit Metadata