skf-forger

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 11, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests and processes data from external files to determine agent state and behavior.\n
  • Ingestion points: The agent reads configuration from {project-root}/_bmad/skf/config.yaml, preferences from {sidecar_path}/preferences.yaml, and knowledge content from fragment files referenced in skf-knowledge-index.csv.\n
  • Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the LLM to ignore or separate instructions potentially embedded in these external files.\n
  • Capability inventory: The agent can invoke various other skills (e.g., skf-setup, skf-create-skill, skf-analyze-source) that perform filesystem and repository operations.\n
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the content read from external files is described before it is interpolated into the agent context.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill implements a 'Pipeline Mode' that dynamically parses and executes a sequence of other tools based on user input.\n
  • Evidence: The skill processes user strings containing multiple workflow codes (e.g., BS CS TS EX) or aliases (e.g., forge, onboard) to dynamically sequence the invocation of registered agent capabilities.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 11, 2026, 09:53 AM