outbound
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 7, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to construct shell commands by interpolating parameters into a single-quoted
curlpayload inSKILL.mdandreferences/tools-reference.md. This pattern is vulnerable to command injection if arguments, such as untrusted email bodies, contain single quotes that can terminate the JSON string and allow for execution of arbitrary shell commands on the host machine. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted incoming email content to drive automated workflows like sentiment classification and follow-up sequencing, creating an indirect prompt injection surface.
- Ingestion points: The
list_received_emailstool inclassify-replies/SKILL.mdandfollow-up/SKILL.mdreads external email bodies into the agent's context. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to the agent to distinguish between system instructions and external email content or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to
send_email,add_email_tag, and manage audience segments, which could be abused by an attacker via crafted email content. - Sanitization: Absent. The instructions lack any requirement for validation, escaping, or sanitization of ingested email text.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata