skill-system-cockpit

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill manifest explicitly requests the proc.exec capability. While the defined operations (derive-state, render-feedback, tui) are configured to run the skill's own scripts/cockpit.py, this permission grants the underlying script the ability to spawn arbitrary system processes.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill functions by ingesting data from multiple sources to derive a shared state, which presents a risk of indirect prompt injection if the ingested data is influenced by an attacker.
  • Ingestion points: Reads content from note/note_tasks.md, note/note_feedback.md, and database tables including agent_tasks, evolution_nodes, and evolution_rejections.
  • Boundary markers: The skill documentation does not mention the use of delimiters or specific instructions to the agent to ignore any embedded prompts within the ingested markdown or database content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities including filesystem read/write (fs.read, fs.write), database access (db.read), and process execution (proc.exec).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or schema validation is described for the data ingested from the markdown files before it is processed into the cockpit state object.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Mar 20, 2026, 02:07 PM