skill-system-cockpit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Mar 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill manifest explicitly requests the
proc.execcapability. While the defined operations (derive-state,render-feedback,tui) are configured to run the skill's ownscripts/cockpit.py, this permission grants the underlying script the ability to spawn arbitrary system processes. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill functions by ingesting data from multiple sources to derive a shared state, which presents a risk of indirect prompt injection if the ingested data is influenced by an attacker.
- Ingestion points: Reads content from
note/note_tasks.md,note/note_feedback.md, and database tables includingagent_tasks,evolution_nodes, andevolution_rejections. - Boundary markers: The skill documentation does not mention the use of delimiters or specific instructions to the agent to ignore any embedded prompts within the ingested markdown or database content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities including filesystem read/write (
fs.read,fs.write), database access (db.read), and process execution (proc.exec). - Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or schema validation is described for the data ingested from the markdown files before it is processed into the cockpit state object.
Audit Metadata